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Abstract
We revisit the issue of connections between
two leading formalisms in nonmonotonic rea-
soning: autoepistemic logic and default logic.
For each logic we develop a comprehensive
semantic framework based on the notion of a
belief pair. The set of all belief pairs together
with the so called knowledge ordering forms
a complete lattice. For each logic, we intro-
duce several semantics by means of fixpoints
of operators on the lattice of belief pairs. Our
results elucidate an underlying isomorphism
of the respective semantic constructions. In
particular, we show that the interpretation
of defaults as modal formulas proposed by
Konolige allows us to represent all seman-
tics for default logic in terms of the corre-
sponding semantics for autoepistemic logic.
Thus, our results conclusively establish that
default logic can indeed be viewed as a frag-
ment of autoepistemic logic. However, as
we also demonstrate, the semantics of Moore
and Reiter are given by different operators
and occupy different locations in their corre-
sponding families of semantics! This result
explains the source of the longstanding diffi-
culty to formally relate these two semantics.
In the paper, we also discuss approximating
skeptical reasoning with autoepistemic and
default logics and establish constructive prin-
ciples behind such approximations.
1 INTRODUCTION
Due to their applications in knowledge representation
and, more specifically, in commonsense reasoning, ab-
duction, diagnosis, belief revision, planning and rea-
soning about action, default and autoepistemic logics
are among the most extensively studied nonmonotonic
formalisms1. Still, after almost two decades of research
in the area several key questions remain open.
The first of them is the question of the relationship be-
tween default and autoepistemic logics. Default logic
was introduced by Reiter [Rei80] to formalize reason-
ing about defaults, that is, statements that describe
what normally is the case, in the absence of contradict-
ing information. Autoepistemic logic was proposed by
Moore [Moo84] to describe the belief states of ratio-
nal agents reflecting upon their own beliefs and disbe-
liefs. Although the motivation and syntax of both log-
ics are different, it has been clear for a long time that
they are closely related. However, despite much work
[Kon88, MT89a, Tru91, MT93, Got95] no truly satis-
factory account of the relationship was found. Kono-
lige [Kon88] related default logic to a version of au-
toepistemic logic based on the notion of a strongly
grounded expansion — a concept that depends on
a syntactic representation of a theory. Marek and
Truszczynski related default logic to two modal non-
monotonic logics related but different from autoepis-
temic logic: the nonmonotonic modal logicN [MT89a]
and nonmonotonic modal logic S4F [Tru91]. Finally,
Gottlob [Got95] found a relationship between default
and autoepistemic logics but the translation he used
was not modular. In fact, he proved that a modu-
lar translation of default logic into autoepistemic logic
does not exist. These results seem to point to some
misalignment between extensions of default theories
and expansions of modal theories. Our results in this
paper finally clarify the picture.
Another problem is related to the fixpoint definitions
of extensions (in the case of default logic) and ex-
pansions (in the case of autoepistemic logic). They
1For a detailed discussion of these two formalisms and of
their applications, and for additional references, the reader
is referred to [MT93].
provide no insights into constructive processes agents
might use to build their belief sets based on default
or modal theories describing base facts. Finally, there
is a problem of high computational complexity of rea-
soning with extensions and expansions. The problems
to decide the existence of an extension (expansion) is
Σ2P -complete, the problem to compute the intersection
of extensions (expansions) — it is needed for skeptical
reasoning — is Π2P -hard.
In this paper we develop a unifying semantic treat-
ment of default and autoepistemic logics and use it
to address the three issues discussed above. For each
logic we define a family of 2-, 3- and 4-valued semantics
and show that they include all major semantics for de-
fault and autoepistemic logics. Within our framework
we define semantics that generalize Kripke-Kleene and
well-founded semantics for logic programs. These se-
mantics allow us to approximate skeptical default and
autoepistemic reasoning and they can be computed
faster than extensions and expansions (assuming that
the polynomial hierarchy does not collapse). Most im-
portantly, we show that the unified semantic picture
of default and autoepistemic logics described here al-
lows us to pinpoint the exact nature of how they are
related.
Our approach is motivated by the algebraic approach
proposed by Fitting in his analysis of semantics for
logic programs with negation [Fit99], and extends our
earlier work on 3-valued semantics for autoepistemic
logics [DMT98]. It relies on the concept of a belief
pair, a pair (P, S), where P and S are sets of 2-valued
interpretations. The concept of a belief pair general-
izes the notion of a possible-world structure, that is,
a set of 2-valued interpretations, often used to define
the semantics of the modal logic S5 and also used by
Moore and Levesque [Moo84, Lev90] in their work on
autoepistemic logic. Specifically, each possible-world
structure Q can be identified with a belief pair (Q,Q).
Belief pairs allow us to approximate the state of be-
liefs of an agent whose beliefs are represented by a
possible-world structure.
Given a possible-world structure Q or a belief pair B,
it is often possible to describe a way in which Q (or B)
could be revised to more accurately reflect the agent’s
beliefs. Such a revision procedure can be formally de-
scribed by an operator. Fixpoints of such operators
are often used to specify semantics of nonmonotonic
formalisms as they represent those belief states of the
agent that cannot be revised away. Sometimes fix-
points that satisfy some minimality conditions are ad-
ditionally distinguished.
These intuitions underlie the original definition of an
expansion of a modal theory T as a fixpoint of a certain
operator DT on the set of all possible-world structures
[Moo84]. In [DMT98], it is shown that the operator
DT can be extended to the set of belief pairs. The re-
sulting operator, DT , yields a multi-valued generaliza-
tion of expansions and a semantics that approximates
skeptical autoepistemic reasoning. We refer to it as
the Kripke-Kleene semantics as it generalizes Kripke-
Kleene semantics for logic programs. In this paper, we
derive from the operator DT two new operators and
show that their fixpoints give rise to semantics for au-
toepistemic theories under which circular dependence
of beliefs upon themselves, present in autoepistemic
logic of Moore, is eliminated. One of these semantics
is shown to correspond to Reiter’s semantics of default
logic. The other one can be viewed as a generalization
of the well-founded semantics.
While possible-world semantics were used in the study
of autoepistemic logic, they had only a marginal effect
on the development of default logic. In this paper, we
show that possible-world semantics approach can be
extended to the case of default logic. Namely, in a
close analogy with autoepistemic logic, for every de-
fault theory ∆, we introduce an operator E∆ defined
on the set of belief pairs. We show that the oper-
ator E∆ gives rise to three other operators and that
the fixpoints of these operators yield several seman-
tics for default theories. Among these semantics are
the semantics of extensions by Reiter, the stationary
semantics [PP94], the well-founded semantics for de-
fault logic [BS91] (it approximates skeptical reasoning
under extensions), the semantics of weak extensions
[MT89a] and the Kripke-Kleene semantics (it approx-
imates skeptical reasoning under weak extensions).
Our results settle the issue of the relationship between
autoepistemic and default logics. We show that the
operators E∆ and DT are closely related if a default
theory ∆ is interpreted as a modal theory T given by
the translation proposed by Konolige [Kon88]. Our re-
sults show that under the Konolige’s translation, the
families of semantics for default and autoepistemic log-
ics are isomorphic and default logic can be viewed, as
has long been expected, as a fragment of autoepistemic
logic. But this correspondence does not relate exten-
sions and expansions! The semantics corresponding to
these concepts occupy different locations in their re-
spective families of semantics and have different prop-
erties.
We also point out that the Kripke-Kleene and well-
founded semantics studied in the paper have better
computational properties than the semantics of ex-
pansions and extensions. We conclude with comments
about further generalizations and open problems.
2 PRELIMINARIES
The formal language for the semantic study developed
in this paper is that of lattices, operators and fixpoints.
The key result is that by Tarski and Knaster [Tar55]
stating that a monotone operator on a complete lattice
has a least fixpoint.
By At we denote the set of atoms of the propositional
language under consideration. The set of all 2-valued
interpretations of At will be denoted by A. Any set
Q ⊆ A is called a possible-world structure and can be
viewed as a universal Kripke model [Che80]. Possible-
world structures are a basic tool in semantic studies
of modal logics. They were also used in the context of
autoepistemic logic [Moo84, Lev90, MT93].
A collection of all possible-world structures will be de-
noted by W . This set can be ordered by the reverse
set inclusion: for Q1, Q2 ∈ W , Q1 ⊑ Q2 if Q2 ⊆ Q1
(the smaller the set of possible worlds, the bigger the
theory it determines). Clearly, 〈W ,⊑〉 is a complete
lattice. To study formalisms based on the modal lan-
guage, we define the truth function HQ,I inductively
as follows (Q is a possible-world structure, I ∈ A is an
interpretation):
1. HQ,I(p) = I(p), if p is an atom
2. Boolean connectives are handled in the standard
Tarskian way
3. HQ,I(Kϕ) = t, if for every interpretation J ∈ Q,
HQ,J (ϕ) = t, and HQ,I(Kϕ) = f, otherwise.
The value of a modal atom Kϕ given by HQ,I does
not depend on I. Thus, it is determined only by
the possible-world structure in question. It is clear
that the meta-knowledge specified by a possible-world
structure Q is complete: all modal atoms Kϕ are ei-
ther true or false with respect to Q.
For every modal theory T , Moore [Moo84] defined an
operator DT on W by:
DT (Q) = {I : HQ,I(ϕ) = t, for every ϕ ∈ T}.
Moore called the theory of a fixpoint of DT an expan-
sion2.
In [DMT98], Moore’s approach was extended to the 3-
valued case, in which a possibility of incomplete meta-
knowledge is admitted. A key concept is that of a belief
2In the paper, we will frequently use the same term
to denote the fixpoint of an operator and its theory. So,
fixpoints of DT will be referred to as expansions, as well.
pair, that is, a pair (P, S) of possible-world structures.
In a belief pair (P, S), P can be viewed as a represen-
tation of a conservative (pessimistic) view on what is
believed while S can be regarded as a representation
of a liberal (gullible) view. If S ⊆ P , formulas be-
lieved in according to the conservative view captured
by P , are believed in according to the liberal view rep-
resented by S. Consequently, a belief pair (P, S) such
that S ⊆ P is called consistent. However, the ways
in which the agent establishes the estimates P and S
may be independent of each other and, thus, we allow
belief pairs (P, S) such that S is not a subset of P .
We refer to them as inconsistent3. In applications we
are mostly interested in consistent belief pairs. Con-
structive techniques for building belief pairs given a
base theory, which are described in the paper, result
in consistent belief pairs. However, admitting inconsis-
tent belief pairs completes the picture, leads to simple
intuitions behind mathematical arguments and results
in more elegant algebraic structures.
With a belief pair (P, S) and a 2-valued interpreta-
tion I we associate a 2-valued truth function H2(P,S),I
defined on a modal language. The idea is to define
H2(P,S),I(ϕ) so that it provides a conservative estimate
to the truth value of ϕ with respect to a belief pair
(P, S). Since P represents a conservative point of view
and S a liberal one, to get a conservative estimate we
use P to evaluate positive occurrences of modal atoms
and S to evaluate negative ones. The definition is in-
ductive:
1. H2(P,S),I(p) = I(p), for every atom p
2. Conjunction and disjunction are treated in the
standard Tarskian way
3. H2(P,S),I(¬ϕ) = ¬H
2
(S,P ),I(ϕ)
4. H2(P,S),I(Kϕ) = t if H
2
(P,S),J(ϕ) = t for all J ∈ P .
H2(P,S),I(Kϕ) = f, otherwise.
We stress that when evaluating the negation of a for-
mula the roles of P and S are switched, which ensures
that modal literals appearing positively in a formula
are evaluated with respect to P while those appearing
negatively are evaluated with respect to S.
Clearly, to construct a liberal estimate for the truth
value of ϕ with respect to a belief pair (P, S) we can
proceed similarly and use S (P ) to evaluate modal
literals appearing positively (negatively) in ϕ. It is
easy to see, however, that the resulting truth function
3In [DMT98] only consistent belief pairs were consid-
ered.
can be expressed as H2(S,P ),I (we reverse the roles of P
and S).
Conservative and liberal estimates of truth values of
formulas can be combined into a single 4-valued esti-
mate. We say that the logical value of a formula ϕ is
true, t4 (false, f4), if both conservative and liberal esti-
mates of its truth value are equal to t (f). We say that
the logical value ϕ is unknown, u, if the conservative
estimate is f and the liberal estimate is t. Finally, the
logical value of ϕ is inconsistent, i, if the conservative
estimate is t and the liberal estimate is f. Thus, the
estimates given by H2(P,S),I(ϕ) and H
2
(S,P ),I(ϕ) yield a
4-valued truth function
H4(P,S),I(ϕ) = (H
2
(P,S),I(ϕ),H
2
(S,P ),I(ϕ)),
where t4 = (t, t), f4 = (f, f), u = (f, t) and i = (t, f).
We define the meta-knowledge of a belief pair (P, S) as
the set of all formulas ϕ such that both conservative
and liberal estimates of the truth value of the epistemic
atom Kϕ coincide (are both true or are both false).
Clearly, the meta-knowledge of a belief pair (P, S) need
not be complete. For some modal atoms Kϕ the two
estimates may disagree (Kϕ may be assigned value u
or i). However, it is easy to see, that for a complete
belief pair (P, P ), H4(P,P ),I = HP,I , for every interpre-
tation I ∈ A. In other words, belief pairs and the truth
function H4(P,S),I generalize possible-world structures
and the truth function HP,I . In addition, for a con-
sistent belief pair (P, S), H4(P,S),I never assigns value i
and coincides with the 3-valued truth function defined
in [DMT98].
The set of all belief pairs is denoted by B. It can be
ordered by the knowledge ordering kn: (P1, S1) kn
(P2, S2) if S1 ⊆ S2, and P2 ⊆ P1. The set B with
the ordering kn forms a complete lattice and, con-
sequently, a kn-monotone operator on B is guaran-
teed to have a least fixpoint by the result of Tarski
and Knaster [Tar55]. The ordering kn coincides with
the ordering of increasing meta-knowledge (decreasing
meta-ignorance): (P1, S1) kn (P2, S2) if and only if
the set of modal atoms with the same conservative and
liberal estimates with respect to (P1, S1) is contained
in the set of modal atoms for which conservative and
liberal estimates with respect to (P2, S2) are the same.
Let (P, S) be a belief pair. Following [DMT98], we set
DT (P, S) = (D
l
T (P, S),D
u
T (P, S)),
where
DlT (P, S) = {I:H
2
(S,P ),I(T ) = t}
and
DuT (P, S) = {I:H
2
(P,S),I(T ) = t}.
Fixpoints of the operator DT will be called partial ex-
pansions.
Speaking intuitively, the operatorDT describes how an
agent might revise a belief pair (P, S). The possible-
world structure P is replaced by the structure P ′ con-
sisting of those interpretations I for which all formulas
from T are true according to the liberal estimates of
truth values (given (P, S)). A liberal criterion for se-
lecting possible worlds (interpretations) to P ′ results
in a possible-world structure capturing a conservative
point of view. By duality between conservative and
liberal approaches, S can be replaced by S′ consist-
ing of all interpretations I such that all formulas from
T are true according to the conservative estimates of
truth values (given (P, S)).
Let us recall that DT stands for the operator intro-
duced by Moore. The operator DT allows us to recon-
struct the semantic approach to autoepistemic logic
proposed by Moore.
Theorem 2.1 Let T be a modal theory. Then,
for every possible-world structure P , DT (P, P ) =
(DT (P ), DT (P )). Consequently, a belief pair (P, P )
is a fixpoint of DT if and only if P is a fixpoint of DT .
Theorem 2.1 implies that there is a natural one-to-one
correspondence between the complete partial expan-
sions of T and the expansions of T . Thus, partial ex-
pansions (consistent partial expansions) can be viewed
as 4-valued (3-valued) generalizations of Moore’s ex-
pansions.
The key property of the operator DT is its kn-
monotonicity. It follows that DT has a unique kn-
least fixpoint. We denote it by KK(T ) and refer to
it as the Kripke-Kleene fixpoint (or semantics) for T 4.
Kripke-Kleene fixpoint has a clear constructive flavor
(it can be obtained by iterating the operatorDT , start-
ing at the least informative belief pair, (A, ∅)). It ap-
proximates all partial expansions and, in particular,
approximates the skeptical reasoning with expansions.
Theorem 2.2 Let T be a modal theory.
1. The fixpoint KK(T ) is consistent.
2. For every partial expansion B of T , KK(T ) kn
B.
3. If Kϕ is true with respect to KK(T ) then ϕ be-
longs to every expansion of T . If Kϕ is false with
4There is a close analogy between the least fixpoint of
the operator DT and the Kripke-Kleene semantics for logic
programs.
respect to KK(T ) then ϕ belongs to no expansion
of T .
Deciding the truth value of a modal atom Kϕ with
respect to the Kripke-Kleene fixpoint is in the class
∆2P [DMT98]. Thus, unless the polynomial hierarchy
collapses, it is a simpler problem than the problem of
computing expansions or their intersection.
We can also use the Kripke-Kleene semantics as a test
for the uniqueness of an expansion. Namely, we can
first computeKK(T ) and check ifKK(T ) is complete.
If it is, T has a unique expansion. This method is com-
putationally better (again, if the polynomial hierarchy
does not collapse) than the straightforward one which
computes all expansions of T . However, it is incom-
plete — there are theories T with a unique expansion
and such that KK(T ) is not complete.
3 AUTOEPISTEMIC LOGIC
The operator DT allows us to define two additional op-
erators: the operatorDstT defined on the latticeW , and
the operator DstT defined on the lattice B. They give
rise to new semantics for autoepistemic logic that are
closely related to the semantics of extensions for de-
fault logic. One of them is a perfect match to Reiter’s
semantics of extensions for default logic, an object long
sought after in the autoepistemic logic.
Let us recall that the operator DT associates with
each belief pair (P, S) its revised variant (P ′, S′) =
DT (P, S). The way in which P
′ is obtained is described
by the operator DlT . Namely, P
′ = DlT (P, S). If we
fix S, this operator becomes a monotone operator on
W (it follows from the fact that DT is kn-monotone).
Hence, its least fixpoint can be viewed as the preferred
revision of P , given a fixed S. Let us define, then,
DstT (S) = lfp(D
l
T (·, S)).
Similarly, we can argue that lfp(DuT (P, ·)) can be re-
garded as a preferred revision of S, given P . It turns
out that lfp(DuT (P, ·)) = D
st
T (P ). Thus, we define an
operator DstT on belief pairs as follows:
DstT (P, S) = (D
st
T (S), D
st
T (P )).
Clearly, DstT is an operator on W . The fixpoints of
the operator DstT (and also their theories) will be re-
ferred to as extensions. The choice of the term is not
arbitrary. We show in Section 5 that extensions of
modal theories can be regarded as generalizations of
extensions of default theories. We have the following
property relating fixpoints of the operators DstT and
DstT .
Theorem 3.1 For every modal theory T , a possible-
world structure P is a fixpoint of DstT if and only if a
belief pair (P, P ) is a fixpoint of DstT .
It follows that the semantics of fixpoints of DstT can be
viewed as a 4-valued version of the semantics of exten-
sions. Similarly, consistent fixpoints can be thought
of as a 3-valued generalizations of extensions. Conse-
quently, we refer to the fixpoints of the operator DstT
as partial extensions.
The circular dependence allowing the agent to accept p
to the belief set just on the basis of this agent believ-
ing in p, allowed under the semantics of expansions,
is eliminated in the case of extensions. For instance,
the theory {Kp ⇒ p} has two expansions. One of
them is determined by the possible-world structure
consisting of all interpretations, the other one — by
the possible-world structure consisting of all interpre-
tations in which p is true. It is this second expansion
that suffers from circular-argument problem: the belief
in p is the only justification for having p in this expan-
sion. In the same time, the theory {Kp ⇒ p} has
exactly one extension, the one given by the possible-
world structure consisting of all interpretations. The
atom p is not true in it and, hence, circular arguments
are not used in the construction of this expansion.
The operator DstT is antimonotone. It follows that
the operator DstT (P, S) is kn-monotone. Thus, by
the result of Tarski and Knaster, it has the least fix-
point. We will denote this fixpoint by WF (T ) and
refer to it as the well-founded fixpoint (or semantics)
of T . Our choice of the term is again not accidental.
This semantics is closely related to the well-founded se-
mantics of default logic [BS91] and logic programming
[VRS91]. We have the following result indicating that
well-founded semantics can be used to approximate all
partial extensions and, in particular, all extensions of
a modal theory. It also shows that the well-founded se-
mantics provides a sufficient condition for the unique-
ness of an extension.
Theorem 3.2 Let T be a modal theory and let
WF (T ) = (P, S). Then:
1. The fixpoint WF (T ) is consistent.
2. For every partial extension B, WF (T ) kn B.
3. If H4
WF (T ),I(Kϕ) = t, then ϕ belongs to every
extension of T . Similarly, if H4
WF(T ),I(Kϕ) = f,
then ϕ does not belong to any extension.
4. If WF (T ) is complete (that is, P = S) then T has
a unique extension corresponding to the possible-
world structure P .
Based on the approach developed in [DMT98] for com-
puting the Kripke-Kleene semantics, we can establish
computational properties of the well-founded seman-
tics. We have the following result.
Theorem 3.3 The problem of computing the well-
founded semantics is the class ∆2P .
Thus, assuming that the polynomial hierarchy does
not collapse, computing the well-founded semantics of
a theory T is easier than computing the intersection
of extensions of T (that is, the set of skeptical conse-
quences of T ). Since the well-founded semantics of a
modal theory T approximates all extensions, it can be
used to speed up the computation of their intersection.
The next result connects expansions and the Kripke-
Kleene semantics with extensions and the well-founded
semantics. It shows that the well-founded semantics is
stronger than the Kripke-Kleene semantics and that
(partial) extensions of T are (partial) expansions of T
satisfying some minimality condition.
Theorem 3.4 Let T be a modal theory. Then:
1. KK(T ) kn WF (T ).
2. Every extension of T is a ⊑-minimal expansion of
T .
3. Every partial extension (P, S) of T is a minimal
partial expansion of T in the following sense: for
every partial expansion (P ′, S′), if P ′ ⊑ P and
S′ ⊑ S, then P = P ′ and S = S′.
We conclude this section with a schematic illustration
of the panorama of semantics for autoepistemic logic.
The central position is occupied by the operator DT .
Its fixpoints yield the semantics of partial expansions
and its least fixpoint yields the Kripke-Kleene seman-
tics. Restriction of the operator DT to complete belief
pairs leads to the operator DT , originally introduced
by Moore, and results in the semantics of expansions.
The operator DT also gives rise to the operators DstT
and DstT that yield new semantics for autoepistemic
logic: the semantics of extensions, the semantics of
partial extensions and the well-founded semantics.
4 DEFAULT LOGIC
While possible-world semantics played a prominent
role in the study of autoepistemic logics [Moo84,
Lev90, DMT98] they have not, up to now, had a sim-
ilar impact on default logic. In this section we will
introduce a comprehensive semantic treatment of de-
fault logic in terms of possible-world structures and
AE logic of Moore
expansions
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Figure 1: Operators associated with autoepistemic
logic
belief pairs. Our approach will follow closely that used
in the preceding sections.
We observed earlier that autoepistemic logic can be
viewed as the logic of the operator DT . Its fixpoints,
and fixpoints of the operators that can be derived from
DT , determine all major semantics for autoepistemic
logic. We will now develop a similar treatment of de-
fault logic.
As before, we start with a 2-valued truth function that
gives a conservative estimate of the logical value of
a formula or a default with respect to a belief pair
(P, S) and an interpretation I. For a propositional
formula ϕ, we define Hdl(P,S),I(ϕ) = I(ϕ). For a default
d = α:β1,...,βk
γ
, we set Hdl(P,S),I(d) = t if at least one of
the following conditions holds:
1. there is J ∈ S such that J(α) = f
2. there is i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k such that for every J ∈ P ,
J(βi) = f
3. I(γ) = t.
We set Hdl(P,S),I(d) = f, otherwise. Clearly, the defi-
nition of Hdl(P,S),I(d) agrees with the intuitive reading
of a default d: it is true, according to a conservative
point of view, if its prerequisite is false (even with re-
spect to a liberal view captured by S) or if at least one
of its justifications is definitely impossible (it is false
according to a conservative point of view captured by
P ) or if its consequent is true (in I). As before, we can
also argue that Hdl(S,P ),I(d) provides a liberal estimate
for a truth value of d with respect to (P, S) (the roles
of P and S are reversed).
Let ∆ = (D,W ) be a default theory. We use the
truth function Hdl(P,S),I to define an operator E∆ on
the lattice B of belief pairs:
E∆(P, S) = (E
l
∆(P, S), E
u
∆(P, S)),
where
E l∆(P, S) = {I:H
dl
(S,P ),I(∆) = t}
and
Eu∆(P, S) = {I:H
dl
(P,S),I(∆) = t}.
This definition can be justified similarly as that of the
operator DT in Section 3.
We will now define a 2-valued version of the operator
E∆. To this end, we use the following result.
Theorem 4.1 Let ∆ be a default theory. If B ∈ B is
complete then E∆(B) is also complete.
Let Q be a possible-world structure. We define
E∆(Q) = Q
′,
where Q′ is a possible-world structure such that
E∆(Q,Q) = (Q′, Q′) (its existence is guaranteed by
Theorem 4.1).
To the best of our knowledge, the operator E∆ has
not appeared explicitly in the literature before. Its
fixpoints, however, did. In [MT89a], the concept of a
weak extension of a default theory was introduced and
studied (the approach used there was proof-theoretic).
It turns out that fixpoints of the operator E∆ corre-
spond precisely to weak extensions of ∆. Thus, the
semantics given by the operator E∆ is precisely the
semantics of weak extensions.
Theorem 4.2 Let ∆ be a default theory. Then:
1. A propositional theory T is a weak extension of
a default theory ∆ according to [MT89a] if and
only if T = {ϕ: I(ϕ) = t, for every I ∈ Q} for a
fixpoint Q of E∆.
2. A possible-world structure Q is a fixpoint of E∆
if and only if a belief pair (Q,Q) is a fixpoint of
E∆.
In view of Theorem 4.2(1), we call fixpoints of the op-
erator E∆ weak extensions. Theorem 4.2(2) implies
that complete fixpoints of the operator E∆ are in one-
to-one correspondence with the fixpoints of the oper-
ator E∆. Thus, we call fixpoints of the operator E∆
— partial weak extensions (they can be regarded as a
4-valued generalization of weak extensions, consistent
fixpoints can be regarded as 3-valued generalizations).
The key property of the operator E∆ is its kn-
monotonicity. Thus, E∆ has a least fixpoint. We call it
the Kripke-Kleene fixpoint and denote it by KK(∆).
We refer to the corresponding semantics as the Kripke-
Kleene semantics for ∆.
The Kripke-Kleene semantics can be obtained by it-
erating the operator E∆ starting with the least infor-
mative belief pair (A, ∅). Thus, it has a constructive
flavor. Second, it approximates the skeptical reasoning
with weak extensions and provides a test for unique-
ness of a weak extension.
Theorem 4.3 Let ∆ be a default theory and let
KK(∆) = (P, S).
1. The fixpoint KK(∆) is consistent, that is, S ⊆ P .
2. If I(ϕ) = t for every I ∈ P , then ϕ belongs to
every weak extension. If J(ϕ) = f for some J ∈ S,
ϕ does not belong to any weak extension.
3. If P = S (that is, if KK(∆) is complete) then ∆
has a unique weak extension corresponding to the
possible-world structure P .
The Kripke-Kleene semantics is computationally at-
tractive. Deciding whether a formula is in the intersec-
tion of the weak extensions of a default theory ∆ is Π2P -
complete. In contrast, by adapting the methods devel-
oped in [DMT98] to the case of default logic we can
show that the problem of computing KK(∆) (specif-
ically, assuming KK(∆) = (P, S), deciding whether
I(ϕ) = t for every I ∈ P , or whether J(ϕ) = f for
some J ∈ S) is in the class ∆2P .
So far we have not yet reconstructed the concept of an
extension. In order to do so, we will now derive from
E∆ two other operators related to default logic. Let us
consider a belief pair (P, S). We want to revise it to
a belief pair (P ′, S′). We might do it by fixing S and
taking for P ′ a preferred revision of P , and by fixing
P and taking for S′ a preferred revision of S.
It is easy to see that kn-monotonicity of E∆ implies
that the operator E l∆(·, S) is ⊑-monotone operator on
W . Consequently, it has a least fixpoint. This fixpoint
can be taken as the preferred way to revise P given S.
Thus, we define
Est∆ (S) = lfp((E∆)
l(·, S))
As in the case of autoepistemic logic, one can see that
Est∆ also specifies the preferred way to revise S given
P , that is Est∆ (P ) = lfp(E
u
∆(P, ·)). Thus, we define the
operator on B as follows:
Est∆ (P, S) = (E
st
∆ (S), E
st
∆ (P )).
It turns out that the concept of extension as defined
by Reiter can be obtained from the operator Est∆ . It
is known that Reiter’s extensions are theories of fix-
points of the operator Σ∆ introduced by Guerreiro
and Casanova [GC90] (see also [Lif90, MT93]). One
can show that the operator Est∆ coincides with the op-
erator Σ∆. Thus, we have the following result.
Theorem 4.4 A theory T is an extension of a de-
fault theory ∆ if and only if T = {ϕ: I(ϕ) =
t, for every I ∈ Q} for some fixpoint Q of Est∆ .
In view of Theorem 4.4, we refer to the fixpoints of Est∆
as extensions. We have the following result relating
fixpoints of the operators Est∆ and E
st
∆ .
Theorem 4.5 Let ∆ be a default theory. For every
possible-world structure P , P is a fixpoint of Est∆ if
and only if (P, P ) is a fixpoint of Est∆ .
It follows that the fixpoints of Est∆ can be regarded as
4-valued (3-valued, in the case of consistent fixpoints)
generalizations of an extension of a default theory. We
will therefore call them partial extensions. It turns
out that partial extensions coincide with stationary
extensions defined in [PP94].
Our next result describes monotonicity properties of
the operators Est∆ and E
st
∆ .
Theorem 4.6 Let ∆ be a default theory. Then, the
operator Est∆ is ⊑-antimonotone and the operator E
st
∆
is kn-monotone.
Theorem 4.6 implies that the operator Est∆ has a least
fixpoint. We will denote it by WF (∆) and refer to
it as the well-founded fixpoint of ∆. We will call the
semantics it implies a well-founded semantics of ∆.
The well-founded semantics of ∆ coincides with the
well-founded semantics of default logic introduced by
Baral and Subrahmanian [BS91]. The well-founded
semantics allows us to approximate skeptical reasoning
with extensions and yields a sufficient condition for the
uniqueness of an extension.
Theorem 4.7 Let ∆ be a default theory and let
WF (∆) = (P, S). Then:
1. The fixpoint WF (∆) is consistent.
2. For every partial extensions B of Est∆ ,
WF (∆) kn B.
3. If J(ϕ) = t for every I ∈ P , then ϕ belongs to
every extension. If J(ϕ) = f for some J ∈ S, ϕ
does not belong to any extension.
4. If P = S (that is, if WF (∆) is complete) then
∆ has a unique extension corresponding to the
possible-world structure P .
Well-founded semantics has a constructive flavor. It
can be obtained by iterating the operator Est∆ over the
belief pair (A, ∅). In addition, by extending the ap-
proach described in [DMT98], one can show that the
problem of computing the well-founded semantics is in
the class ∆2P .
Finally, let us note connections between (partial) weak
extensions and (partial) extensions, and between the
Kripke-Kleene and well-founded semantics for default
logic.
Theorem 4.8 Let ∆ be a default theory. Then:
1. KK(∆) kn WF (∆).
2. Every extension of ∆ is a ⊑-minimal weak exten-
sion of ∆.
3. Every partial extension (P, S) of ∆ is a minimal
partial weak extension of ∆ in the following sense:
for every partial weak extension (P ′, S′), if P ′ ⊑
P and S′ ⊑ S, then P = P ′ and S = S′.
In summary, default logic can be viewed as the logic
of the operator E∆. Its fixpoints define the seman-
tics of partial weak extensions. The least fixpoint of
E∆ defines the Kripke-Kleene semantics. The operator
E∆ gives rise to the operator E∆, which yields the se-
mantics of weak extensions. Kripke-Kleene semantics
provides an approximation for the skeptical reasoning
under the semantics of weak extensions. The operator
E∆ also leads to the operator Est∆ . Consistent fixpoints
of this operator yield stationary extensions. Fixpoints
of a related operator Est∆ , defined on the lattice W ,
correspond to extensions by Reiter. The least fixpoint
of the operator Est∆ results in the well-founded seman-
tics for default logic and approximates the skeptical
reasoning under the semantics of extensions. The re-
lationships between the operators of default logic are
illustrated in Figure 2.
5 DEFAULT LOGIC VERSUS
AUTOEPISTEMIC LOGIC
The results of the paper shed new light on the relation-
ship between default and autoepistemic logics. The
nature of this relationship was the subject of exten-
sive investigations since the time both systems were
introduced in early 80s. Konolige [Kon88] proposed to
encode a default d = α:β1,...,βk
γ
by the modal formula
weak extensions
 ✒
Kripke-Kleene fixpoint
❅❘
E∆
E∆
partial extensions
well-founded semantics
 ✠
Reiter’s extensions
❅■
Est∆
Est∆
 
 ✠
 ✒✠
❅
❅❘
Figure 2: Operators associated with default logic
m(d) = Kα ∧ ¬K¬β1 ∧ . . .¬K¬βk ⊃ γ and to repre-
sent a default theory ∆ = (D,W ) by a modal theory
m(∆) =W ∪{m(d): d ∈ D}. Despite the fact that the
encoding is intuitive it does not provide a correspon-
dence between default logic as defined by Reiter and
autoepistemic logic as defined by Moore. Consider a
default theory ∆ with W = ∅ and D = { p:q
p
}, where p
and q are two different atoms. Then ∆ has exactly one
extension, Cn(∅). Applying the translation of Kono-
lige to ∆ yields the theory m(∆) = {Kp∧¬K¬q ⊃ p}.
The theory m(∆) has two expansions. One of them
is generated by the theory Cn(∅) and corresponds to
the only extension of ∆. The other expansion is gen-
erated by the theory Cn({p}). Thus, the Konolige’s
translation does not give a one-to-one correspondence
between extensions of default theories and expansions
of their modal encodings.
This mismatch can be explained within the semantic
framework introduced in the paper. Konolige’s trans-
lation does not establish correspondence between ex-
tensions and expansions because they are associated
with different operators. Expansions are associated
with fixpoints of the operator DT . Its counterpart on
the side of default logic is the operator E∆. Fixpoints
of this operator are not extensions but weak extensions
of ∆. Extensions turn out to be associated with the
operator Est∆ . Its counterpart on the side of autoepis-
temic logic is the operator DstT , introduced in Section
3. This operator, to the best of our knowledge, has
not appeared in the literature and properties of its fix-
points and the relationship to McDermott-Doyle style
logics [MD80, McD82, MT93] are not known.
Once we properly align concepts from default logic
with those from autoepistemic logic, Konolige’s trans-
lation works! This alignment is illustrated in Figure 3
and is formally described in the following theorem.
E∆
E∆ E
st
∆
Est∆
 
 ✠
 ✒ ✠
❅
❅❘
DT
DT D
st
T
DstT
 
 ✠
 ✒ ✠
❅
❅❘
✲
α:β
γ
⇒ Kα ∧ ¬K¬β ⊃ γ
Figure 3: Embedding default logic into autoepistemic
logic
Theorem 5.1 Let ∆ be a default theory and let T =
m(∆). Then the following pairs of operators coincide
and, thus, have the same fixpoints:
1. E∆ = DT (that is, weak extensions correspond to
expansions).
2. E∆ = DT (that is, partial weak extensions cor-
respond to partial expansions; Kripke-Kleene se-
mantics for ∆ and Kripke-Kleene semantics for
T coincide).
3. Est∆ and D
st
T (that is, extensions correspond to
strong expansions).
4. Est∆ and D
st
T (that is, partial extensions correspond
to partial strong expansions, well-founded seman-
tics for ∆ and well-founded semantics for T coin-
cide).
6 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE
WORK
We presented results uncovering the semantic proper-
ties of default and autoepistemic logics. In each case, a
whole family of semantics can be derived from a single
operator by purely algebraic transformations. Most
importantly, the translation of Konolige establishes a
perfect correspondence between the families of seman-
tics of default and autoepistemic logics. This elegant
picture can be further extended to the case of logic
programming. As discovered by Fitting, all key seman-
tics for logic programs can be similarly obtained from
a single operator, the 4-valued van Emden-Kowalski
one-step provability operator [vEK76]. The resulting
semantic structure for logic programming is shown in
Figure 4.
In addition, the translation of logic program clauses
into default rules proposed in [BF91, MT89b] estab-
lishes an embedding of logic programming into default
supported models
 ✒
Kripke-Kleene fixpoint
❅❘
TP
TP
partial stable models
well-founded semantics
 ✠
stable models
❅■
T stP
T stP
 
 ✠
 ✒✠
❅
❅❘
Figure 4: Operators associated with logic program-
ming
TP
TP T
st
P
T stP
 
 ✠
 ✒ ✠
❅
❅❘
E∆
E∆ E
st
∆
Est∆
 
 ✠
 ✒ ✠
❅
❅❘
✲
p← q,not(r) ⇒ q:¬r
p
Figure 5: Embedding logic programming in default
logic
logic that precisely aligns the corresponding semantics
(Figure 5).
Let us further note that the approach to semantics
of nonmonotonic logics presented here can also be ex-
tended to the case of reflexive autoepistemic logic by
Schwarz [Sch95]. As in all other cases discussed in this
paper, all major semantics for the reflexive autoepis-
temic logic can be obtained from a single approximat-
ing operator closely related to the operator DT .
Our work also points to an interesting open problem
in the area of modal nonmonotonic logics. The fix-
points of the operator DstT have not, to the best of
our knowledge, been studied in the literature. In par-
ticular, it is not known if they can be described in
the McDermott-Doyle scheme [MD80, McD82] as S-
expansions for some modal logic S.
Finally, let us mention that it is possible to develop an
abstract, purely algebraic treatment of the concept of
approximations. It generalizes the approach presented
here and the work of Fitting on logic programming
semantics. An account of this abstract treatment of
approximations can be found in [DMT00].
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